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During the last few years there has been a verbal battle of rising,
crescendo over the philosophical doctrines of the late Mr. Justice
Holmes.1 It is not particularly important here either to attack or de-
fend the great justice's place in history. Even in death he can pretty
well take care of himself. However, it might be instructive to call at-
tention to certain aspects of this debate which are indicative of some
of the startling defects in modern judicial and juridical thinking, and
to a means of curing these defects.
WORD MONGERING
The process of the argument against Holmes is to use words
extracted from speeches, letters, and judicial decisions, cleverly woven
together indiscriminately and out of context, in an attempt to give a
slant to his philosophy of life. Just as the Devil can quote scripture, it
seems that these theologians and their cohorts can quote this devil for
their purposes. The trend of the reasoning is to imply that Holmes'
philosophy is totalitarian.
One of the more recent detractors of Holmes in an article in the
American'Bar Association Journal has summed up his argument under
the title, "The Totalitarianism of Mr. Justice Holmes," as follows:2
"Here is the nub of the whole controversy. Many liberals admired
Holmes because they did not know of or consider the totalitarian im-
plications of his philosophy.., there is encouragement in his doctrine,
that the test of truth is its ability to get itself accepted in the market
place, or that truth is 'the majority view of that nation which can lick
all others.' If Stalin conquers, then in the philosophy of Mr. Justice
Holmes, atheistic communism will become the truth." So if Stalin wins,
Mr. Justice Holmes is a totalitarian. By like argument if the democ-
racies win, he is a democrat.3 How silly can we get?
* This is in substance a paper delivered at the Jurisprudence Round Table of
the Association of American Law Schools on December 28, 1951.
*0 Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
1 See Lucey, Holmes - Liberal - Humanitarian - Believer in Democracy? 39
GEo. L. J. 523 (1951) and articles there cited. See also, CHARTrL, OuR LEGAL SYstEM
AND How IT OPERArs §7-45 (1951).
2 Palmer, 37 A. B. A. J. 811 (1951).
3 "Holmes, of course, was a Republican," BowEN, YANKE FROM OLyMPUs
411 (1944).
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It must be said in fairness to this recent school of natural lawyers
that they did not invent this process of thinking; but skillfully adopted
it as a type of persuasion in good standing with the legal profession
who constantly twist words by lifting them out of context for use in
briefs, arguments and judicial decisions.
With apologies to Mr. Vishinsky, it should be noted that this type
of word mongering has also been equally indulged in by the followers
of Mr. Justice Holmes. In a recent case, United States v. Dennis,4
Chief Justice Vinson, borrowing from Holmes, makes the following
statement: 5 "Nothing is more certain in modem society than the
principle that there are no absolutes, that a name, a phrase, a standard
has meaning only when associated with the considerations which give
birth to the nomenclature. To those who would paralyze our Govern-
ment in the face of impending threat by encasing it in a semantic
straight jacket we must reply that all concepts are relative." He then
proceeds to hold in accordance with great popular demand that
the Smith Act6 may interfere with freedom of speech when that
freedom results in advocacy of revolution against the government.7
The trouble with Mr. Justice Vinson's argument is that the founding
fathers, being disciples of the natural law, believed in absolutes, and
the First Amendment to the Constitution states such an absolute as
follows: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech." The Smith Act abridges the freedom of speech by punishing
the teaching of revolution and is therefore plainly, within the diction-
ary and historical meaning of words, unconstitutional. The advocates
of natural law, are, of course, correct in their criticism of this type of
technique. When Holmes, speaking as a philosopher, stated that there
were no absolutes, his words should never have been lifted out of
context to destroy the plain meaning of a Constitutional provision
stated in absolutistic terms. To encourage this type of thinking by
word mongering, in any legal system, simply leads to legal anarchy
whether it be done in support of, or in opposition to popular demands.
It is essential to clear thinking that a sharp distinction be drawn
between a pragmatic or scientific concept, that there are not in human
behavior, or should not be in the laws governing it, any absolutes,
and the problem of deciding a case under a written law which, perhaps,
wrongly in the belief of Mr. Justice Holmes, has been stated in terms
4 341 U. S. 494 (1951).
5 Id. at 508.
6 54 STAT. 671 §§ 2 and 3 (1940).
7 Even more reprehensible is Mr. Justice Frankfurter's sophistry, 341 U. S.
at 519 ff., by which he attempts to demonstrate that advocacy of revolution was
not within the meaning of freedom of speech protected by the First Amend-
ment, when any American school boy educated before 1918 should know better.
The only sound argument in support of the decision is Mr. Justice Jackson's, at
p. 561 ff., that the defendents are punished for conspiracy, not speech.
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of an absolute. Whether one likes it or not, the natural law theories of
absolute truth have exerted a tremendous influence upon our law
makers and the drafters of our Constitution. Natural law absolutes
have found their way into the very structure and fabric of our legal
system and cannot be disposed of by a philosophical expression which
is itself absolutely stated-"there are no absolutes." Anyone who be-
lieves that Mr. Justice Holmes himself would have fallen into this
sort of a fallacy does discredit to his memory whether he be a follower
or an opponent of his basic philosophy.
We may not like absolutes but one cannot simply, by denying
their existence, get rid of them wherever they exist in our system of
written law and still make any pretext of administering government
by law. If one wants to be free of natural law absolutes he should dis-
pose of them by due process of amendment and not by sophistry and
word mongering.
THE SCIENTIFIc FUNCTION oF ABSOLUTES
The question, of course, still remains whether it is wise, proper, or
useful to attempt to state either scientific laws or man made govern-
ment laws in terms of the absolute. The former should be left to the
physical scientists. The latter is a problem which the jurists will have
to solve. It should be noted in passing that even in the field of phy-
sical sciences, the leaders no longer confidently speak in terms of
absolute knowledge. Here in the realm of the so-called exact sciences
Einstein's relativity, Hisenberg's principal of uncertainty,8 Planck's
statements that we cannot discover reality but that we can see only
shadows of the shadows9 are the popular order of the day. The
chemists who once had a well worked out chart of indestructible atoms
as the building blocks of the universe now frankly admit that they lack
even an integrated theory to explain the nature of matter.10 But in
spite of this absence of absolute knowledge, never in history has man
been able to exert the control over physical matter which he now
possesses.
In the field of social or juridical science-we are just emerging from
the era of dogmatic truth. In the past there has been a great reliance
on absolutes. The talk about fundamental values, social ends, moral
8 Jeans, Exploring the Atom in READINGS IN THE PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL
SCIENCES 337 (Shapley Wright and Rapported 1948); see also SULLIVAN, LIMITA-
TIONS OF SCIENCE 72 (Mentor ed. 1949).
9 PLANc, THE UNIVERSE IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN PHYSICS (Johnsons Trans.
1931); BIDGMAN, THE LOGIC OF MODERN PHYSICS 33 (1927).
10 Marshak, The Multiplicity of Participles, 186 SCIENTIFIC AmEmUCAN 23
(Jan. 1952).
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concepts, basic theories of human relations which can be solved only
by return to the true church, the family, the marriage concept, by de-
velopment of democracy, the rule of the proletariat or government by
law and not of men, has dominated our social sciences and our juridi-
cal thinking. Only recently have we begun to emerge from the shadows
of mysticisms and dogmatism in matters effecting social and legal
concepts. It would be a brave social scientist today who would say that
the list of fundamentals mentioned above are unsupported pseudo-
scientific wives tales with no experimental verification. Holmes great
intellectual stature was partly due to the fact that he fearlessly was
willing to question these so called absolutes.
In the social field natural law has long been willing to provide
absolute answers. As is well known, the natural law theorists for
centuries have claimed that there exists in the nature of things an
absolutely perfect rule of law for each given situation which can be
written into man made government law. One may not only be willing,
but anxious to go along with this natural law philosophy. There may
be absolutes; there is comfort in believing that there are. Life would
be much more simple if there were. It is easy to grant that the universe
is so constituted that there is, in the relations of man to man, among
all the possible rules of law which might be applied, one which is
best fitted for governing each relationship. The only question is how
can it be found?
Trm BASIS OF NATURAL LAW ABSOLUTES
The natural law theories of the past and present seem to offer
two ways of discovering this higher or perfect law. One is reason; the
other divine guidance or revelation.
Taking the theory of divine guidance first, if there is a Diety who
propounds such rules, and one may be perfectly willing and happy to
admit that there is, to whom does He reveal His messages? Granting
that He by hypothesis has a perfect sending set, there seems to be
slight difficulty with the human receiving apparatus. Among those
who purport to have been in contact with the Source of all wisdom,
as for example, Christ, Buddha, Mohammed, Confucius, to name only
a few, different results seem to have been reached for the perfect rule
governing almost every problem that comes under the ken of law. For
example, the conflict on the legality of plural marriages under the
various systems is well known.
In a primitive society having only one basic religion, laws
grounded on its revealed precepts might work fairly successfully; but in
a polyglot world such as the one in which we live, whether it be the
United States or the world at large, these absolutes come into basic
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conflict. Even in our own country we have the Protestants, Catholics,
Christian Scientists and Mormons, to name only a few, who would
reach conflicting decisions on the absolute truth behind the law of
plural marriage and its correlary, legal divorce. If each is to follow his
own conscience and, according to classical natural law theory, obey
only the law which corresponds to his revealed absolutes, anarchy is
assured.
Now turning to reason as a source of the absolutes. Natural law
in the United States alone has been used to justify revolution, 1' con-
fiscation of property,' 2 maintenance of the status quo,' 3 the sanctity
of property rights over human rights' 4 and vice-versa. 15 Logic, rhe-
toric, disputation and word mongering on both sides seem equally
potent.
In the broader fields of government structure and international
relationships, reason can be, and has been brought to bear to support
democracy, dictatorship, altruism and might makes right. Our current
international impasse is based on natural law approaches grounded on
reason on both sides. The communists and the free world equally ap-
peal to reason. Both systems from the point of view of logic, rhetoric,
appeals to history and just common sense are equally attractive to large
bodies of converts. On appeal to reason alone, Karl Marx seems to be
able to convince as many people as the capitalistic democrats. The re-
sult, of course, is war and international chaos. In the past we fought
many religious wars and revolutions in which each side was positive of
the truth of its absolutes. We are now talking in terms of similar wars
based upon absolutes of political and economic beliefs. This has been
the result of two thousand years of natural law thinking on both
sides, and nothing new seems to be involved in the present cry to
return to natural law.
Of course, this is all old stuff in the field of philosophy and one
should apologize for offering it again here, if it were not for the fact
that there are among us, lawyers, jurists, and a substantial group of
people who, in despair of obtaining any results from shallow realism,
are returning to the simple faith of Aquinas and Aristotle. Like Hitler,
they seem to believe that a statement can be made true simply by repeat-
ing it and building up a structure of reasoning about it. It is sub-
mitted that it is time to move on to other procedures for testing the
validity of legal concepts and the usefulness of particular rules of law.
11 The Declaration of Independence.
12 Royce, The Squatter Riot of 1850 in Sacramento in HALL, READINGS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 314 (1938).
13 Rutherford as quoted by Hall supra note 12, at 68 ff.
14 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (1911).
15 See Notes 12 and 13 supra, and collection of material Hall, note 12
supra Ch. 8.
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THE PROOF OF NATURAL LAW HYPOTHESES By
EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE
So far as this discussion is concerned, natural law thinking and
methods offer excellent initial hypotheses, but not necessarily absolute
conclusions. The apparatus of proof for an hypothesis based on
natural law can be found in experimental jurisprudence. 16 If someone
offers a rule of law which seems to be sound in logic and reason, why
not take it, try it out, and see how it works in society. (I am speaking
here as a jurist, not as a judge. The judge under our doctrine of
separation of powers as we are presently experimenting with it, is, of
course, within the limits of meaning of words, bound to follow the
rule of law as stated in the statute or constitution).
In the past it was objected that we could not test rules of law by
experiments because methods of observation had not been developed.1 7
This is no longer true. Social science, psychology and many other
sciences have given us means for measuring and testing human
reactions to law.
It would take a treatise of monumental proportions compiled by
a team of scientists from every field to name all the modern scientific
devices and methods available to study the efficiency of a given rule of
law as an instrument of social control. Space allows only an indication
of a few which have been successfully applied.
The questionnaire and statistical method was used at Johns
Hopkins Institute to study divorce and court procedure. The volume
and thoroughness of that even incomplete experiment' s shows beyond
a doubt that in the area of judicial activity cases are so numerous as
to be subject to mathematical classification and comparative statistical
treatment which will eliminate objections of variations of personal
bias or lack of repetition of the phenomena studied, and so yield data
which can be subjected to true scientific analysis.
Kinsey19 has applied interview technique and statistics to demon-
strate conclusively that the effectiveness of laws governing sex activity
is open to scientific scrutiny, which when applied to human activity
in the mass should yield valid suggestions for change in the laws20
16 See Beutel, An Outline of the Nature and Methods of Experimental Juris-
prudence, 51 COL. L. REv. 415 (1951).
17 Among others see COHEN, THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES
(1927).
18 For a good example of such technique see MARSHALL AND MAY, THE Di-
voRcE COURT. Maryland (1932); id. Ohio (1933). These are only two of about
twenty similar studies published by the Institute.
10 KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948).
20 Cf. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 136, 155, 206, 271 ff. (1951).
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and procedures governing sex activity. His work also indicates that if
this most intimate of human activities can be effectively reached by
such methods, they are even more likely to succeed in many other
places where law touches human conduct of a more observable nature.
The Gluecks2 1 have combined teams of experts in psychology,
medicine, anthropology, statistics, counseling, law and others to delve
into the effect of criminal laws and juvenile delinquency. Under this
combined attack there are beginning to emerge mass pictures of
human reactions to laws which make it possible to set up predictions
of individual reactions to laws, 22 governing juvenile delinquency,
which in turn when verified will throw light on the effectiveness of the
laws themselves.
Similar techniques based upon the history of numerous cases and
the environment of individual criminals have been used in the Illinois
Penitentiary to study the parole of criminals. 23 Out of their research
based upon mathematics and advanced methods of observation of social
data and behavior, there is emerging a method for advising parole
boards as to which criminals are good risks for parole and which should
remain incarcerated. 24 In this field social science has already reached
the stage where it is able not only to predict the main effect of laws;
but also to provide helpful advice in determining which individual
cases are good risks for executive clemency.
It has also been demonstrated that whole programs of youth
counseling can be subjected to experimental methods to test their
effectiveness.2 5 By proper matching of individuals subjected to a
certain program and careful study of their careers as the young persons
develop under the guidance or lack of it, a measure of the success of
the method is available. In one study just completed it was demon-
strated that a carefully derived counseling system had no apparent
effect upon the delinquency of its subjects.2 6 On the other hand, a
similar study applied to progressive education showed that its program
uses more efficient methods for training students for college than does
the more conservative curricula.2 7
The success of combining a host of sciences for law enforcement
21 FRvE HUNDRED CRIMINAL CAREERS (1930); FIvE HUNDRE DELINQUENT Wo-
AiEN (1934); LArER CRIUMINAL CAREERs (1937); ONE THOUSAND JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENTS (1939); CRIMINAL CARREERS IN RzmosPEcr (1943); UNRAVELING JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY (1950).
22 See GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY Ch. 20 (1950).
23 OHLIN, SELECTION FOR PAROLE (1951).
24 Id. at 68 ff.
26 POWERS AND WVILMER, AN EXPERIMENT IN PREVENTION OF DELINQUENCY
(1951).
20 Ibid.
27 TimRTY ScHooLs TELL THEm STORY 68 (1943).
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in the Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory is known to all.28
The Federal Budget 29 shows that this organization uses over fifty high
grade technical specialists and as many assistant technicians covering
professions including physicist, chemist, metallurgist, petrographer,
spectrologist, dermatologist, agronomist and many others3 0 all direct-
ing their cooperative efforts to the identification of criminals by
scientific rather than by logical methods.
The reader can probably add many more examples from his own
experience of how numerous scientific methods and devices are used
to study the efficiency in operation of rules of law.
EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE IN ACTION
As a matter of fact, there are now functioning in our society many
examples of complete systems of scientific law making and testing. Two
of the best follow.
In the field of traffic law it had long been thought by law makers
that twenty miles an hour was a proper speed for city traffic and that
stop lights on all dangerous corners could prevent accidents. During
the last two or three decades traffic engineers with delegated powers of
lawmaking have begun to investigate these "obvious natural law
theories" with startling results. A single example will suffice.3 1 It was
observed that at a certain cross-road an unusual number of accidents
were occurring. The city fathers immediately concluded that the ob-
vious thing to do was to put in stop lights; but when these were in-
stalled, to their consternation, accidents increased. They then called
in a traffic engineer. After studying the situation with radar speed
recorders, automatic counting machines, statistical correlations and
other devices of modern science, and relying on previous experiments,
he changed the rule of law from a traffic signal to two psychologically
tested stop signs on one of the intersecting roads. The town fathers
were certain that the traffic engineer was obviously wrong; but a
further study revealed that the new device reduced accidents over
similar periods of time in a ratio of from fourteen to one, while at the
same time speeding up the traffic.
Through this process of passing laws, observing their effect on
society and changing them accordingly, the field of traffic engineering
28 For many of the myriad scientific techniques used see O'HARA & OsTER-
BURG, CRIIINALISTIcS (1949).
29 The Budget of the United States 705 (1951-52); Id. Appendix 281.
30 Personal Services in the F. B. I. Laboratory, F. B. I. Law Enforcement
Bulletin (Oct. 1947).
31 This is taken from an actual traffic study by engineers of the Nebraska
Bureau of Roads and Irrigation.
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has now developed into such a complete science 3 2 that most enlightened
communities have delegated the entire structure of traffic laws to
traffic engineers, who take past rules of law suggested by reason and
subject them to scientific verification. Strange to say, speed limits
under this system operate better from fifteen to fifty miles an hour
within cities, and the most successful rules seldom correspond either
with those indicated by reason or by a majority vote.
The development, enforcement and amendment of laws governing
public health constitute a second example of the use of the methods
of experimental jurisprudence to improve law making and enforce-
ment. The manner in which the United States Public Health Service
has studied and developed laws governing the production and distri-
bution of milk are indicative of methods used in other fields as well.
Since the Public Health Service is primarily a scientific body, it does
not, in approaching its problem of regulating health by law, rely solely
upon the natural law methods of reason or inspiration.
Since the turn of the century this organization has been studying
the effect upon public health of the production and distribution of
milk.33 From these studies there have emerged a series of advances
recommended for adoption at both city and state level. The results of
the adoption of such statutes upon public health and milk-born
epidemics in various localities were studied over a period of years, 3 4
and as a product of the research there has emerged a model Milk
Ordinance and Code recommended by the Public Health Service 35
which has been adopted with only slight variations in over two
thousand communities in thirty-four states ranging in population from
one thousand to over three million.30
After the model ordinance is passed there follows a series of studies
to determine the effectiveness of enforcement, including ratings of the
various producers and distributors to determine the extent to which
they are complying with the new code.3 7 The effect of the code upon
32 A description of this science in terms of experimental jurisprudence ap-
pears in Beutel, Traffic Control as Experimental Jurisprudence in Action, 31 NEB. L.
REv. 349 (1952).
33 See excellent summary of this history, Moss, Milk Investigation of the
U. S. Public Health Service, 3 JouR. OF MiLK TECHNOLOGY 145 (1940).
34 For example see, Fuchs and Kroeze, Results of the Operation of Standard
Milk Ordinance in Mississippi, 45 PUB. HEALTH. REP. 1412 (1930); Clark and
Johnson, Results of the Operation of the Standard Milk Ordinance in Missouri,
46 PUn. HEALTH REP. 1413 (1931).
35 Milk Ordinance and Code, (Fed. Sec. Agency 1939) P. H. Bul. No. 220.
30 List of Communities in Which Milk Ordinance Recommended by the
Public Health Service is in effect, Fed. Sec. Agency, Division of Sanitation (Nov.
1950); note 33 supra.
37 For example see, Report of Milk Sanitation Statutes, F. S. A. Form P.
A. S. 842 (SE) Rex 3-50; Milk Sanitation Ratings 66. PUB. HEALTH RaE. 1086
(1951).
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the communities involved is also the subject of careful scrutiny by
staff experts of the Public Health Service. The findings of their re-
search is then channeled back into amendments to the Model Code,
and the process of study is again repeated.3 8
At the present time the National Research Council is cooperating
with the Public Health Service to study the effectiveness of sanitary
milk and ice cream legislation throughout the entire country.3 9 When
this study is completed there will undoubtedly follow further sug-
gested amendments to the laws in question.
Thus, even where laws are based upon a scientific fact finding
process in aid of the reason which lies behind them, and where the
best devices of modern science are brought to bear to aid the law
maker in his initial attempt to draw the legislation for the public
health, it is found to be useful and profitable to make objective
studies to find out the extent to which the statute actually accomplishes
its purpose.
Ii like manner experimental jurisprudence is being applied in
the field of city planning, airplane traffic control and in many other
places. In each of these areas it has been shown that the best rule of
law to fit a particular situation can be reached, first by the natural law
process of reason; but the rule so obtained must be checked by a team
of scientists who experimentally measure the results of the law in
operation against actual conditions as they exist in society. When this
is done the validity of the law to fit the nature of things can be verified
or improvement suggested.
In the larger fields reliance can also be placed upon scientific
experimental methods to discover the best law to be used in a parti-
cular situation and the jural law or reason which lies behind its
successful application. One can in the outset, if he desires, use divine
inspiration or reason to determine what a law ought to be if only he
will check it against the facts of life. When it is so checked it often
develops that the experimental jural scientist seems to have a better
receiving set from the source of all wisdom about law than does either
the cleric or the philosopher. This experimental process may be long
and complicated in some cases; but is no more expensive than other
fields of science. Recently the Air Force has planned to spend over
a billion dollars to build a wind tunnel to test super-sonic full sized
38 Fuchs, Recent Amendments to the U. S. Public Health Seroice Milk Code,
11 JoUP. OF MILK TECHNOLOGY 149 (June, 1948); Black, Effect of Contemplated
Changes in Standard Methods, 11 id. No. 4. (Aug. 1948); Thomas, Levine and
Black, Studies Showing the Effect of Changes in the (9th) Edition of Standard
Methods in Relation to the Bacteriological Analysis of Milk, 38 Am. JouL OF PUB.
HEALTH 233 (Feb. 1948).
39 See preliminary Report, Dahlberg and Adams, Sanitary Milk and Ice Cream
Legislation, Nat. Research Coun., Bul. No. 121 (July 1950).
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planes and missles. Think what a real experimental juridical science
could do with a fraction of this amount of money applied to the
testing of the validity of public laws.
The devices and machinery are available or can be created. It is
no longer necessary to return to Aristotle and Aquinas or to rely alone
upon reason, rhetoric, word mongering, popular vote or revolution,
to determine the validity or efficiency of a law.
